This is a collection of the key articles written by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, G.P. Baker, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published posthumously. Following Baker’s death in 2002, the volume has been edited by collaborator and partner, Katherine Morris. Contains articles previously only available in other languages, and one previously unpublished paper. Completely distinct from the widely-known work Baker did with P.M.S. Hacker in the Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations.

A who's who of Sartre scholars contribute to a collection of multidisciplinary perspectives from sociology, religion, and bioethics, on a hitherto neglected area of Sartre's philosophy.

This essay contextualises Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect-seeing in connection with his reading of Wolfgang Köhler, and thereby within a wider discussion of seeing. Most commentators devote little attention to the use of ‘see’ with which aspect-seeing is contrasted. It tends to be interpreted in the literature in two contrasting ways which, the author suggests, could be lined up with Köhler’s distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘normal’ modes of perception, corresponding to a distinction between ‘seeing shapes and colours’ and ‘seeing things’. It (...) is argued that Wittgenstein’s ‘aspect-seeing’ use of ‘see’ contrasts differently with each of these. Moreover, it is argued that these three uses of ‘see’ work differently in the context of looking at pictures and looking at the world. Finally, it is suggested that understanding Wittgenstein’s claim that seeing an aspect is ‘seeing a meaning’ is an invitation to contemplate what would be missing from the life of the aspect-blind; and it is suggested that seeing a thingis likewise ‘seeing a meaning’. (shrink)

This is a collection of the key articles written by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, G.P. Baker, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published posthumously. Following Baker’s death in 2002, the volume has been edited by collaborator and partner, Katherine Morris. Contains articles previously only available in other languages, and one previously unpublished paper. Completely distinct from the widely-known work Baker did with P.M.S. Hacker in the Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations.

A novel introduction to Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist phenomenology. Draws parallels between Sartre’s work and the work of Wittgenstein Stresses continuities rather than conflict between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and between Sartre and post-structuralist/post-modernist thinkers, thus corroborating ‘new Sartre’ readings Exhibits the influence of Gestalt psychology in Sartre’s descriptions of the life-world Forms part of the _Blackwell Great Minds_ series, which outlines the views of the great western thinkers and captures the relevance of these figures to the way we think and live (...) today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 23-24 [Access article in PDF] Did You Hurt Yourself? Katherine Morris PEOPLE WITH BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD) frequently deliberately injure themselves, to the extent that "the diagnosis [BPD] rightly comes to mind whenever recurrent self-destructive behaviors are encountered" (Gunderson, 2001, 54) quoted by (Potter, 2003, 1). How are we to understand this puzzling and disturbing behavior?Situating her approach to this question (...) within a general framework that sees the body as a "text" that requires "interpretation," Potter deliberately avoids answering this question in the way we might expect. It is doubtful, she argues, that every act of self-injury has a meaning, and a fortiori doubtful that every such act has the same meaning. Her discussion includes a section, informed by medical anthropology, in which she attempts to distinguish pathological self-injury of the sort that occurs with BPD from such culturally acceptable (or at least culturally understood or tolerated) body modifications, such as tattooing, scarification, and body piercing. It also includes a section in which it is suggested that the meaning of some self-injurious behavior may indicate cultural rather than individual pathologies (e.g., the "commodification" and "objectification" of women's bodies in Western culture). The principal issue for her, however, is how a clinician is to work out the meaning of a particular individual's self-injuring behavior when it does indeed have an individual meaning, and the prerequisite for doing so, she argues, is the cultivation of a virtue she terms giving uptake.The general tenor of her argument seems to me to be admirable: the issues are dealt with subtly and with ethical, anthropological, and philosophical sensitivity. There are nonetheless a number of questions I want to raise. The Framework It is of course fashionable in certain quarters these days to speak of the body as a text. One might, however, wonder to what extent this metaphor is illuminating. After all, texts, one might think, are by definition linguistic; yet part of the point here is precisely to move away from the narrow "speech-act" focus of "traditional philosophical analyses of communication" (Potter 2003, 1-16).The point of the metaphor according to Potter is to "suggest that the body, like other mediums of communication, must be interpreted and that its meanings are not given or inevitable" (Potter 2003, 2). Again, however, this invokes a number of fashionable but questionable ideas: an easy reliance on the difficult idea that "how we experience the world is shaped by our conceptual scheme" (Potter 2003, 3), a structuralist account of signification (Potter 2003, 3), and the concomitant notion that all communication involves interpretation, indeed that the listener (or observer) "relies on linguistic and other conventions [End Page 23] to infer meaning" (Potter 2003, 4). As a general account of communication this seems to me to be wildly off the mark: we very seldom interpret others' words, we very seldom "infer their meaning." The supposition that we always do is the direct consequence of the externalizing of the relation between "signifier" and "signified" that constitutes the heart of structuralist linguistics. 1Now, it may well be that the sort of self-injuring behavior that is the focus of Potter's essay precisely does require interpretation. Insofar as it is expressive behavior (and again Potter is right to question whether it is necessarily always such), it seems to be importantly different, in just these respects, from many other forms of expressive behavior. In the first place, it is different (in just these respects) from the culturally tolerated forms of body modifications discussed in section 2; for members of the culture in which body piercing or tattooing is acceptable or tolerated, such behavior is understood without the need for interpretation. In the second place, it is different in just these respects from natural expressions (e.g., moaning as an expression of pain). And in the third, it is different in just these respects from the expression of thoughts in (at least nonmetaphorical) language (which, one might add, is all the more reason not to think of the body as a... (shrink)

Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and his (...) philosophical importance redeemed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.3 (2002) 281-283 [Access article in PDF] This Is Not Here Katherine Morris How, if at all, are we to characterize psychiatric patients' (and others') descriptions of so-called depersonalization experiences? What exactly are they saying when they say, for example, "I have no self" or "I feel as if I don't belong to my own body" or "Nothing seems real"? Filip and Susanna (...) Radovic attempt to use a combination of conceptual and phenomenological analysis to answer this question. The importance of this, they suggest, is to enable a better definition of the depersonalization syndrome, better classification of symptoms as belonging or not belonging to this syndrome, and better theories of the relevant psychopathological processes.Their conceptual analysis focuses on ambiguities in the words unreal and feel, because "It feels unreal" is a characteristic expression of a depersonalization experience, and on the "as-if" element of these descriptions, because patients will often say "It feels as if everything is unreal." The phenomenological analysis consists in fleshing out some of these senses. These analyses are supplemented with a helpful table and a discussion section distinguishing expressions of depersonalization experiences from similar-sounding expressions from everyday life; for example, "existential reflections" on the one hand, and exclamations like "Did I win? I cannot believe it, it feels so unreal!" on the other. But I focus here on the analyses. Unreal and Feels So, first, they claim that the word unreal has at least three different uses: (1) "nonexistent", (2) "artificial, fake, or made up," and (3) "failing to satisfy some important criterion of the kind in question," which they also express as "not normal" or "unusual," and even "unfamiliar."Already this analysis seems to me to go importantly awry. As Austin famously argued, the word real has multiple senses, including the ones picked out here. 1 But, as he also argued, real, precisely, does not always contrast with unreal; hence an ambiguity in the word real does not imply an ambiguity in the word unreal. An artificial diamond is, indeed, not a real diamond (sense [2])—but it is not an unreal diamond! 2 Again, a friend who does not help you in your hour of need is a "false friend," that is, "not a real friend" (sense [3])—but he is not an unreal friend. Finally, they are surely wrong to equate the false friend's "failure to satisfy some important criterion of friendship" with his being "abnormal" or "unusual" (a fortiori "unfamiliar"). Someone who is "not a real friend" or "not a true friend" is not an unusual or an unfamiliar (sort of) friend!What of their analysis of the ambiguity in feels? (a) Sometimes, they imply, feels means roughly "is believed to be."" (b) At other times, it refers to a specific type of quasi-sensory experience. 3 Thus, I suppose, if I say "I feel ill," I may either mean that I believe myself to be ill or that I am experiencing some characteristic feeling like nausea or dizziness. Hence, feels unreal may either mean "is believed to be unreal" or characterize a specific type of experience.But, as they note, the (alleged) treble ambiguity in unreal means that feels unreal in sense (a) is itself trebly ambiguous, and they suggest that all [End Page 281] three senses may be relevant to characterizing depersonalization experiences. They primarily focus on sense (a3). The thought, as far as I understand it, is that just as a "real friend" is one who helps you in your hour of need, so a "real self" is (inter alia) one that experiences itself as an agent or author of its actions, and a "real world" one full of life and engaging. Thus to say that your self "feels unreal" in sense (a3) is to say that in not experiencing your self as agent or author you recognize that "real selves" do so, and to say that the world "feels unreal" is to say that in experiencing it as lifeless and unengaging you recognize that "real worlds" are not so experienced.So far, so good. But they... (shrink)

Philosophers are wont to say that certain concepts, e.g., the concept of pain, exhibit ‘first/third-person asymmetry’, whereas others, e.g., the concept of injury, do not. The question I wish to address here concerns the status of such claims. They are commonly seen as nothing more than summary reports of how the relevant words are ordinarily used: as statements of ‘grammatical fact’. I want to argue against this view of their status.

Individuals are more likely to remember emotional than neutral information, but this benefit does not always extend to the surrounding background information. This memory narrowing is theorised to be linked to the availability of attentional resources at encoding. In contrast to the predictions of this theoretical account, altering participants' attentional resources at encoding by dividing attention did not affect emotion-induced memory narrowing. Attention was divided using three separate manipulations: a digit ordering task (Experiment 1), an arithmetic task (Experiment 2) and (...) an auditory discrimination task (Experiment 3). Across all three experiments, divided attention decreased memory across the board but did not affect the degree of memory narrowing. These findings suggest that theories to explain memory narrowing must be expanded to include other potential mechanisms beyond the limitations of attentional resources. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Background: Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Sartre's Account of Action Some Wider Background Assessment: Internal Relations Assessment: Human Beings and the Human World References.

This chapter contains section titled: Reading Wittgenstein Wittgenstein and Waismann Further Directions: History of Philosophy Envoi: AWittgensteinian Reading of Wittgenstein?

This chapter contains section titled: The ‘Essence’ of a Philosophical Prejudice One Philosophical Task or Two? Techniques for Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices.

This chapter examines so-called body image disorders, focusing on body dysmorphic disorder, anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, and binge eating disorder. These disorders have been studied extensively by psychologists and psychiatrists from both the "body image" and "body shame" research orientations. Body image disorders have also proved, for feminist thinkers mindful of the gender imbalance in many of these disorders, to be an important locus for cultural criticism, including criticism of psychological and psychiatric perspectives. Those philosophers and anthropologists with a phenomenological (...) bent, particularly those with an interest in the lived body and embodiment, have also found a fruitful terrain in body image disorders. These different disciplines and approaches provide multiple perspectives which are often complementary, occasionally in some tension with one another, but always mutually enriching, and all of them are sketched here. (shrink)

Abstract An understanding of Descartes? concept of ?confusion? is important both for making sense of his epistemological enterprise and for grasping his doctrine of the union of mind and body. An analysis of Descartes? notion of confusion is offered which is grounded in the (more or less controversial) theses that confused thoughts are thoughts, that confusion is confusion by a thinker of one thought with another, and that confusion both can and should be avoided or ?undone?. This analysis takes its (...) rise from his contrast between ?confused? and ?distinct? : it exhibits confusion as a failure to distinguish between meanings of systematically ambiguous expressions. This failure is sometimes due to ?bad intellectual habits? which in his view ought to be broken, sometimes to ?nature? (where the confusion is in general beneficial to our welfare). Paradigmatically these are expressions which refer ambiguously to substances (i.e. mind and body) which are ?really distinct?. Moreover, his ?disambiguations? indicate a central but neglected aspect of his aim in philosophizing: he can be seen as engaged in a moral project of ?philosophical therapy? (shrink)

Noonan's arguments against methodological solipsism ("methodological solipsism," "philosophical studies" 4, 1981) assumes that mental states are individuated by (russellian) content; this assumption entails that narrowness and wideness are intrinsic to mental states. I propose an alternative "extrinsic" reading of methodological solipsism, According to which narrowness and wideness are modes of attribution of mental states, And thus reject the doctrine of individuation by russellian content. Noonan's arguments fail against this version of methodological solipsism.

Philosophers are wont to say that certain concepts, e.g., the concept of pain, exhibit ‘first/third-person asymmetry’, whereas others, e.g., the concept of injury, do not. The question I wish to address here concerns the status of such claims. They are commonly seen as nothing more than summary reports of how the relevant words are ordinarily used: as statements of ‘grammatical fact’. I want to argue against this view of their status.

Volume 27, Issue 1, February 2019, Page 115-119.

Rethinking Existentialism, by WebberJonathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 229.

Nature and Narrative is the launch volume in a new series of books entitled International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry. The series will aim to build links between the sciences and humanities in psychiatry. Our ability to decipher mental disorders depends to a unique extent on both the sciences and the humanities. Science provides insight into the 'causes' of a problem, enabling us to formulate an 'explanation', and the humanities provide insight into its 'meanings' and helps with our 'understanding'. Psychiatry, (...) if it is to develop as a balanced discipline, must draw on input from both of these spheres. Nature (for causes) and Narrative (for meanings) will help define the series as a whole by touching on a range of issues relevant to this 'border country'. With contributions from an international star-studded cast, representing the field of psychiatry, psychology and philosophy, this volume will set the scene for this new interdisciplinary field. This will be of interest to all those with practical experience of mental health issues, whether as providers or as users/consumers of services, as well as to philosophers, social scientists, and bioethicists. (shrink)

Introduction to Global Military History provides a lucid and comprehensive account of military developments around the modern world from the eighteenth century up to the present day. Beginning with the background to the American War of Independence and the French Revolutionary wars and ending with the recent conflicts of the twenty-first century, this third edition combines fully up-to-date global coverage with close analysis not only of the military aspects of war but also its social, cultural, political and economic dimensions and (...) repercussions. The new edition includes a fully revised chapter on conflicts during the eighteenth century, updated coverage of events post-1990 and increased coverage of non-Western conflicts to provide a truly international account of the varied and changing nature of modern military history. Covering lesser-known conflicts as well as the familiar wars of history and illustrated throughout with maps, primary source extracts and case studies, it is essential reading for all students of modern military history and international relations. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.